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1. Introduction  
Though discriminatory energy taxation may to some degree be legitimized for welfare reasons (see 
e.g. Richter and Schneider, 2003), most of the empirical literature find that the existing exemptions 
and tax rebates tend to be costly compared to uniform systems (Ballard and Shoven, 1987, Böhringer 
and Rutherford, 1997, Bye and Nyborg, 2003). In spite of these findings, several countries have 
exempted, energy-intensive export industries from energy taxation; see OECD (1995). The potential 
loss of competitiveness, and hence down scaling of industry, create a political pressure aimed at 
preserving these exemptions. Studies of the tradeoff between overall economic efficiency and political 
pressure aimed at preserving the energy industry, find that a modest share of the welfare gain 
generated by imposing uniform energy taxation or removing existing tax exemptions is lost when 
subsidy and transfer schemes are used to preserve equity values in the energy industry; see Bovenberg 
and Goulder (2001) for the US case, Vollebergh, De Vries and Koutstaal (1997) for the EU case, and 
Bjertnæs and Fæhn (2004) for the Norwegian case. The main explanation is that an energy tax to a 
large extent is shifted on to other economic agents hence substantial amounts of revenue generated can 
still be used to cut other distorting taxes. In several European countries, political pressure from unions, 
local governments, and political parties, are aimed at preserving employment in different industries or 
regions, rather than preserving equity values. Studies of the tradeoff between overall efficiency and 
political pressure aimed at preserving employment in the energy industry find that uniform energy 
taxation combined with a wage subsidy scheme outperform a differentiated energy tax system in terms 
of efficiency; see Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) for the German case, and Felder and Schleiniger 
(2002) for the Swiss case. The main explanation is that the more targeted wage subsidy schemes 
generates smaller distortions between sectors, compared to a differentiated energy tax system, and at 
the same time reduces the distortion in the labor market. 
 
However, national energy tax systems are under pressure from other holds as well. EU pressure 
against any discriminatory policy tends to reduce the scope for national policy. Both discriminatory 
energy taxation and sector specific wage subsidies are tools that are under pressure within the EU 
system. More general subsidy schemes, like subsidies for transport and other transitory schemes, seem 
to face less resistance. Faced with fewer, and less accurate national policy measures, the welfare cost 
of job preserving subsidy schemes are likely to increase. This study contributes to the literature by 
analyzing the tradeoff between efficiency gains from a uniform electricity tax reform and local 
employment concerns, when a more general subsidy scheme preserves employment in the electricity 
intensive industry. A CGE model of the Norwegian economy quantifies the welfare gain of extending 
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the current electricity tax base to include electricity consumption in the manufacturing industry. The 
reform is accompanied by production dependent subsidies designed to preserve the initial level of 
employment in the electricity-intensive industry. The revenue generated by the electricity tax reform is 
used to finance the subsidy scheme, while the remaining part of the revenue is recycled through a 
percentage cut in the payroll tax rate to all firms. The introduction of the electricity tax contributes to 
increase welfare by removing one of several favorable policy measures in this industry. However, the 
production subsidies constitute a new favorable measure, which contribute in the opposite direction. 
About half of the revenue generated is recycled through a reduction in the payroll tax. This contributes 
to lower the substantial tax wedge in the labor market, and hence increase welfare. All in all, the 
welfare increases. Hence, a uniform electricity tax combined with production dependent subsidies 
preserve jobs at a lower welfare cost compared to the current differentiated electricity tax system.  
 
Natural retirement, voluntary exit, and creation of new jobs, are factors that tend to relieve the political 
pressure aimed at preserving employment in the electricity-intensive industry in the long run. Hence, a 
scheme designed to preserve jobs for a limited period of time might be sufficient to neutralize the 
political pressure aimed at preventing a uniform energy tax reform. This study illuminates this further 
by analyzing a scenario where the electricity tax reform is accompanied by job preserving production 
dependent subsidies that, after one decade, is gradually removed the following decade. As less revenue 
is used to finance this subsidy scheme, more revenue is recycled through a percentage cut in the 
payroll tax rate, which contributes to a further reduction in the labor market distortion. The resulting 
welfare increase is larger in this scenario, compared to the scenario with an infinite subsidy scheme.  
 
However, it is not clear whether these jobs are worth preserving. The welfare cost of introducing a job 
preserving subsidy scheme may exceed the welfare cost of alternative policies designed to relieve 
local and regional employment concerns. The functioning of the local labor market is crucial in this 
respect. Completely flexible local markets where workers and other resources are freely allocated into 
other sectors without incurring additional costs would solve temporary local unemployment caused by 
a uniform electricity tax reform. The reallocation of workers and recourses into other sectors also 
contributes to the welfare gain associated with such a reform. On the other hand, restrictions in the 
mobility of labor in the energy industry, combined with wage rigidity, is likely to erode most of the 
potential welfare gain associated with a uniform 2CO  tax reform in the Norwegian economy, Bye 
(2000). The main explanation being that labor from the energy industry is reallocated into 
unproductive unemployment. Hence, both the welfare gain of a uniform energy tax reform, and its 
effect on the local labor market depend crucially on the flexibility of the local labor market. However, 
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the functioning of local labor markets is complex. Fehr and Hjørungdal (1999) find that flexibility in 
local labor markets in combination with government actions are likely to result in modest job search 
costs in most local communities in case of an electricity price increase in the Norwegian electricity-
intensive industry. In this study, I assume completely flexible markets in all communities, and zero 
transaction costs connected to inflexible capital and labor markets. Consequently, there is no local 
unemployment, and the reported welfare gain due to the electricity tax reform do not include 
transaction costs connected to inflexible capital and labor markets. However, excluding transaction 
costs connected to an inflexible local labor market do not affect the conclusions in this study, as 
relevant reform scenarios preserve employment in the electricity intensive industry.   
 
To illuminate further on the tradeoff between efficiency and local/ regional employment concerns, this 
study calculate the potential welfare gain of imposing the uniform electricity tax reform without 
preserving employment in the electricity-intensive industry. The resulting welfare gain is divided by 
the number of full time job years allocated away from the industry. The resulting welfare gain per full 
time job (year) removed from this industry is 432.000 NoK, or 1,5 times the average wage cost. The 
welfare gain of removing the production dependent subsidy scheme is calculated by using the scenario 
where the uniform electricity tax reform is combined with the subsidy scheme as a benchmark. The 
resulting welfare gain of removing the subsidy scheme, divided by the number of full time job years 
removed from the electricity-intensive industry, amounts to approximately 200.000 NoK. These 
potential gains are substantial, suggesting that these jobs are expensive to preserve, even though 
transaction costs connected to inflexible capital and labor markets are not included into the 
calculations. In contrast, Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) report a welfare gain per job preserved by 
their wage subsidy scheme. However, in their analyzes, costs connected to raising revenue to finance 
the wage subsidy scheme are not included. Such costs are included in this study where part of the 
revenue generated by the extended electricity tax base are used to finance the subsidy scheme, instead 
of being recycled through uniform percentage cuts in the payroll tax rate.  
 
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 presents some background information, and the 
methodological aspects of the analysis, including the basic feature of the computable general 
equilibrium model. Section 3 outlines and explains the results, while section 4 concludes.   
6 
2. Method 
2.1. Background 
The main objective of this analyzes is to calculate the welfare effect of a subsidy scheme designed to 
preserve employment in the Norwegian electricity-intensive industry when a uniform electricity tax is 
introduced. Previous analyses indicate that the trade-off issue between efficiency and political 
feasibility is relevant for the Norwegian electricity policy. Bye et al (1999) find that imposing uniform 
electricity price would improve welfare, but at the expense of the electricity-intensive sectors. Thus, 
the gain presumes frictionless reallocation of resources. The electricity-intensive sectors comprising 
the industries Manufacture of Metals, Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles, and Manufacture of 
Industrial Chemicals, is responsible for almost 1/3 of total electricity consumption in Norway, and it 
generates about 10-15 percent of the total export revenues (including oil and gas). At present, it enjoys 
several favorable policy measures, including low payroll taxes due to rural location1, low electricity 
prices according to favorable long-term power contracts, and exemptions from energy taxes; both the 
consumer tax on electricity and the CO2 tax. As the sectors basically use hydropower, this analysis 
focuses on the electricity tax system.2 In the present system, final consumers, primary industries, and 
service industries, including transportation and construction, pay an electricity tax rate of 0.095 
NOK/KWh3, while all manufacturing industries are exempted.  
2.2. The design of the analysis 
All reform scenarios are changes from a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The BAU is a projection 
of the Norwegian economy, where all exogenous variables are set in accordance with the reference 
scenario in the Long Term Program of the Norwegian government; See Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance (2001). Policy variables are kept at their (real) 1999 levels.  
 
In the reference reform scenario the current electricity tax exemptions of the manufacturing industries 
are abolished. Compared to the BAU scenario, the reference reform consists of two components: 
i) The electricity tax component: The manufacturing industries are faced by an electricity tax at the 
same level as the tax already imposed on households and remaining industries, 
                                                     
1 This type of differentiation is included into this study because EU is likely to accept this type of policy from 2007.    
2 Compared to CO2 taxes, the arguments in favor of taxing electricity in Norway are less based on environmental reasoning 
and more a question of raising public revenue.   
3 This equals approximately 1.2 Eurocents/KWh when 1 EUR = 7.92 NOK.   
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ii) The electricity tax revenue recycling component: The revenue is recycled back to the representative 
consumer through a uniform percentage pay roll tax rate decrease for firms in all sectors.  
 
In the job-preserving reform scenario, the same electricity tax reform is accompanied by production 
dependent subsidies designed to preserve employment within the energy-intensive export sector. Thus, 
compared to BAU, the job-preserving reform scenario will also influence through two additional 
components. 
iii) The production subsidy component: The production in the energy-intensive export industry is 
subsidized to preserve the BAU level of employment in this sector.   
iv) The subsidy financing component: The revenue from the electricity tax is shortened in order to 
finance the production subsidy scheme. This results in a smaller percentage pay roll tax rate decrease 
(compared to the decrease in the reference reform). 
 
The two components in the subsidy scheme are decomposed by simulating the subsidy financing 
scenario, where the electricity tax reform in the reference reform scenario is accompanied by the 
subsidy financing component. The extra revenue is transferred lump sum to the representative 
consumer, instead of being used to finance the production subsidy scheme. Hence, the reform consists 
of components i), ii), and iv). The objective of this scenario is to quantify the costs of raising revenue 
to finance the subsidy scheme.  
 
Finally, I simulate the time constrained job-preserving reform scenario, which consists of the 
electricity tax reform, i.e. component i) and ii), in addition to a time constrained subsidy scheme. This 
scheme consists of introducing component iii) and iv) the first decade, and gradually removing these 
two components the subsequent decade. The electricity tax reform components are included for an 
infinite period of time. Components included in the various reforms are presented in table 2.1.    
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Table 2.1: Reforms and components.  
                              Reform:  
 
Component: 
Reference reform Job-preserving 
reform 
Subsidy financing 
scenario 
Time constrained 
job-preserving 
reform 
The electricity tax  
component x x x x 
The electricity tax revenue 
recycling component  x x x x 
The production subsidy 
component   x  x* 
The subsidy financing 
component   x x x* 
*two decades  
 
2.3. Basic features of the computable general equilibrium model 
2.2.1. General features 
The numerical intertemporal general equilibrium model for the Norwegian economy gives a detailed 
description of the structures of economic policy, production, and consumption in the Norwegian 
economy. The model has 41 private and 8 governmental production activities; see Table A.1. Fæhn 
and Holmøy (2000) give a more extensive verbal description of the model, while Heide et al. (2004) 
present a formal, one-sector version. 
2.2.2. Consumer behaviour 
Consumption, labour supply, and savings result from the decisions of an infinitely lived representative, 
forward-looking consumer, who maximises present value of utility subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint. Utility originates from material consumption and leisure consumption, according to an 
Origo-adjusted Constant Elasticity of Substitution function (OCES); see Bye (2003) and Bye and 
Holmøy (1997), and the material consumption is allocated across 26 different consumer goods in a 
nested OCES function (see figure 2B, appendix B) The OCES specification allows the income 
elasticities to vary among goods. 
2.2.3. Producer behaviour, technology and product markets 
Producer behaviour is generally specified at the firm level. The structure of the production technology 
is represented by a nested tree-structure of CES-aggregates. All factors are completely mobile and 
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malleable4.  The manager of the firm is assumed to be rational and forward-looking and maximise the 
present value of the cashflow to owners; see details in Holmøy, Larsen and Vennemo (1993) and 
Holmøy, Nordén and Strøm (1994).   
 
The domestic market structure is assumed to be a large group case of monopolistic competition, where 
each firm has some market power in their respective home markets. According to evidence on markup 
pricing by Norwegian firms (Klette, 1999 and Bowitz and Cappelen, 2001), market power is small; in 
most industries markups are set to 5 percent. Each firm produces a variety of a product that is an 
imperfect substitute for other varieties of this product (represented by Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences). The elasticity of substitution among the varieties of a product is calibrated to be 
consistent with the estimated markup ratios.5  
 
World prices are assumed to be unresponsive to domestic demand and supply. The export markets and 
the home markets are assumed segregated, due to firms' adjustment costs of reallocating deliveries 
between the two markets. Domestic and imported products are imperfect substitutes according to the 
Armington hypothesis. The production technology is described by the CES tree structure in figure B.1. 
in the appendix. There is decreasing returns to scale in the composite factor input. An entry/exit 
condition determines the number of firms in an industry.  
 
The only net-export price that responds to changes in domestic behaviour is the electricity price. The 
Norwegian electricity market is part of a Nordic, competitive market where domestic supply and 
demand affect the common Nordic market price. The relation between the Nordic electricity price, and 
Norwegian net import, is consistent with a numerical Nordic electricity market model 6; a net import 
increase of 1 TWh increases the Nordic price by 0.03 eurocents/KWh. The Norwegian supply of 
electricity is based on hydropower, which is assumed to be exogenously, and gas power, which is 
implemented as a backstop technology. 
2.2.4. The government 
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services from the 
industries and abroad. Overall government expenditure is exogenous and increases at a constant rate. 
                                                     
4 On exception is the production of electricity, see Holmøy et al. (1994). 
5 In order to maximize profits, the firm sets the markup ratio equal to σ/(σ−1), where σ is the substitution elasticity among 
varieties.   
6 Aune and Hansen (2004) document the estimations, while Johnsen (1998) documents the Nordic electricity market model. 
See Holmøy et al. (1994) for a detailed description of the domestic supply and demand for electricity.  
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The model incorporates a detailed account of the government’s revenues and expenditures. In the 
policy experiments it is required that the nominal deficit and real government spending follow the 
same path as in the baseline scenario, implying revenue neutrality in each period. 
3. Results 
3.1. The Reference Reform: Effects of equalizing the electricity tax 
This section outlines the main effects of the reference reform, while a more detailed descriptions is 
given in Bjertnæs and Fæhn (2004).  
 
The direct increase in the input prices of electricity of 0.095 NOK/KWh, measured in 1999 NOK, 
represents a price increase in most manufacturing industries of about 30 percent along the path. For 
the energy-intensive export industries the percentage price increase is larger, as they initially enjoy 
low electricity prices, partly due to lower distribution costs per KWh, and partly due to favorable long-
term price contracts with the government. In the first year, the direct, price increase averages 60 
percent for the energy-intensive export sector, while the increase is 47 percent on average in the long 
run. The initial effect of the revenue recycling is to reduce the payroll tax rate by about 6 percent, i.e. 
from 13,1 percent to about 12.3 percent.     
 
The macroeconomic responses to these reform elements are described in Bjertnæs and Fæhn (2004). 
Table 3.1 reports the resulting changes in the economy. The downscaling of the energy-intensive 
export sector and the gas power generation has strong implications for capital demand, as these sectors 
are highly capital-intensive. Thus, investments fall. The aggregate capital stock falls by 0.38 percent in 
the long run. This, along with a reduction of labor supply of 0.06 percent due to the wage fall, explains 
the long-run GDP fall of 0,35 percent. The GDP fall only constitutes about 1/5 of the reduction in 
gross production, while 4/5 of the fall originates from a fall in intermediate goods. This mostly takes 
place in the energy-intensive export sector, while other industries, including several manufacturing 
industries, increase their output. All industries, except the energy-intensive export sector, face cost 
reductions due to a lower wage cost, reduced prices of capital goods and intermediates, and reductions 
in the Nordic electricity price. The latter takes place as a consequence of the downscaling of the 
energy-intensive export sector, which leads to a substantial reduction in electricity demand. 
 
Net export of electricity increases in the short run, and compared to the BAU scenario, the production 
of gas power is reduced, and the introduction is postponed by 5 years (from 2012 to 2017). This 
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reduces the Nordic price of electricity in the short run, while it remains unaffected in the long run. The 
long run price of electricity is determined by the costs of gas power, which is hardly affected by this 
reform.   
 
The cost reductions are shifted on to prices in the domestic markets according to fixed mark up 
pricing. The price increase on electricity used in the manufacturing industry has lead firms in the 
electricity-intensive industry to substitute electricity intensive machinery, for labor. This contributes to 
explain why their percentage fall in employment only constitutes about half of their percentage fall in 
production. The reduction in the Nordic price of electricity moderates both this substitution effect, and 
the downscaling effect. A price increase on domestic electricity-intensive goods also tends to moderate 
the downscaling effect. All in all, about 2400 full time jobs are reallocated away from the electricity 
intensive industry in 2010, increasing to approximately 3600 in 2030.   
 
The welfare gain of this reference reform measured as the present value of utility changes in all 
periods is 0.04 percent, which is substantially lower than the long-run impact on the utility level. The 
reduction in consumer prices on leisure and material consumption is more modest in the earlier 
periods, hence, a substitution of consumption of leisure, goods and services towards later periods takes 
place.  
 
The small welfare effect is due to both small effects on resource allocations as well as various 
allocation effects pulling in opposite directions. The main contributions are reductions of two tax 
wedges in the economy, which, in isolation, tend to improve welfare. The first is the initial electricity 
price discrimination between different industries; the second is the reduction of the, initially 
considerable, taxation of labour income. The reform is also associated with a modest terms-of-trade 
loss in the electricity market that pulls the welfare gain downwards. As Norway is a net exporter of 
electricity in the reference reform scenario, the Nordic price decrease of electricity generates a terms-
of-trade loss.  
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Table 3.1: Effects of the reference reform, the job-preserving reform, and the subsidy financing 
reform, % changes from the BAU scenario 
 Reference reform Job-saving reform Subsidy financing reform 
Year 2010 2030 Steady st 2010 2030 Steady st 2010 2030 Steady st
GDP -0.02 -0.17 -0.35 -0.02 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 -0.26 -0.44
Material 
cons. 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Labor 
supply 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.13 -0.13
Full* 
consumption -0.005 0.056 0.077 -0.008 0.030 0.029 -0.022 0.038 0.048
Wage rate, 
consumers  -0.33 -0.63 -0.70 -0.11 -0.25 -0.22 -0.56 -0.94 -0.94
Price, mater. 
cons. -0.52 -0.74 -0.77 -0.26 -0.31 -0.29 -0.53 -0.72 -0.76
Export -0.87 -2.22 -4.20 -0.54 -1.18 -1.81 -0.91 -2.36 -4.28
Import -1.00 -1.52 -1.26 -0.54 -0.76 -0.54 -1.05 -1.59 -1.3
Payroll tax 
rate -5.2 -7.0 -5.6 -2.8 -3.2 -2.8 -2.8 -3.2 -2.8
Labor force, 
Manu.metals -7.1 -13.3 -21.1 0  0 0 -7.1 -13.5 -21.2
Gross prod. 
Manu.metals -14.4 -21.5 -27.6 -9.2 -11.5 -11.9 -14.4 -21.6 -27.6
Electr. price 
Manu.metals 36.3 49.9 49.6 38.5 50.5 50.4 36.2 49.9 49.6
Electr. use 
Manu.metals -30.4 -40.8 -46.1 -25.8 -39.8 -45.9 -30.4 -40.9 -46.2
*Full consumption constitutes a composite of material consumption and leisure.  
 
3.2. The job-preserving reform scenario: Effects of the subsidy scheme 
3.2.1. Effects of the subsidy scheme 
Two additional components, the production subsidy component (iii) and the subsidy financing 
component iv)) are added in the job-preserving reform scenario, in addition to the components in the 
reference reform scenario. Comparing the welfare level in these two scenarios reveal the total welfare 
cost of preserving the BAU-level of employment in the energy-intensive industry with the 
implemented subsidy scheme.  
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The simulations reveal that the welfare gain of the job-preserving reform scenario amounts to 60 
percent of the welfare gain of the reference reform scenario. Hence, 40 percent of the welfare gain 
generated by the electricity tax reform is lost when the subsidy scheme is introduced.    
 
The subsidy financing scenario decompose the effects of the subsidy scheme by comparing this 
scenario with the reference reform scenario and the job-preserving reform scenario, respectively. The 
subsidy financing scenario includes the electricity tax reform components in addition to the subsidy 
financing component. The latter component consists of setting the payroll tax rate decrease identical to 
the payroll tax rate decrease in the job-preserving reform scenario, and transferring the remaining 
revenue lump-sum to the representative consumer. Hence, no subsides are introduced to prevent a fall 
in employment in the electricity-intensive industry in this scenario. The effects of the electricity tax 
reform components are analyzed in section 3.1, and will not be repeated.  
3.2.2. Effects of the subsidy financing component: 
A comparison of the subsidy financing scenario, with the reference reform scenario, reveal the effects 
of the subsidy financing component. This component consists of a higher over all payroll tax rate, 
where the subsequent higher revenue is transferred lump-sum to the representative consumer.  
 
The first round effect of the higher payroll tax rate in the subsidy financing scenario is a cost increase 
of labor, which reduces production, especially in exports where product prices are exogenously 
determined in the world market. The cost increase is shifted on to domestic prices, inducing 
substitution towards imports. These effects lead to a current account deficit, and excess labor supply. 
Comparing simulations of the subsidy financing scenario with the reference reform scenario shows 
that the general equilibrium effect on the steady state wage rate is a reduction of 0,24 percent (0,94 
percent -0,70 percent see table 3.1), and most of the cost increase due to the higher payroll tax rate is 
neutralized. The price on material consumption is almost unaffected, and hence, the real wage rate is 
reduced. This results in a modest reduction in the aggregate labor supply, which contributes to restore 
equilibrium in the labor market. The cost decrease due to the wage rate reduction contributes to reduce 
the cost increase resulting from the higher payroll tax rate, which contributes to restores the 
international competitiveness. Some of the cost decrease is shifted on to domestic prices, which leads 
to substitution of imports for domestic goods. The external balance is restored at a slightly lower level 
of both exports and imports.  
 
A comparison of the welfare level in the subsidy financing scenario, with the welfare level in the 
reference reform scenario, shows that the welfare cost of raising revenue through uniform payroll tax 
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increases to finance the subsidy scheme, amounts to 44 percent of the welfare gain in the reference 
reform scenario. The reduction in labor supply in combination with a large tax wedge between 
material consumption and leisure contributes to explain this welfare cost7.  
 
The revenue recycling effect is crucial for the welfare effects of the subsidy scheme, as 44 percent of 
the welfare gain in the reference reform is lost when approximately half of the revenue generated is no 
longer recycled as percentage cuts in the payroll tax rate. The magnitude of production subsidies 
needed to preserve employment in the electricity-intensive industry determines the amount of revenue 
needed to finance the subsidy scheme. The level of production subsidies needed to preserve 
employment in the electricity intensive industry are determined by the employment effects from the 
electricity tax reform, as well as effects from the subsidy scheme. The electricity tax reform has lead 
firms in the electricity intensive industry to substitute away from electricity intensive machinery, and 
towards more labor-intensive production. The pre tax price decrease of electricity in early decades has 
moderated the down-scaling effect, and hence, the fall in employment. The fall in the electricity price 
generates a substitution effect away from labor towards electricity intensive machinery. However, the 
latter effect is weaker, and the reduction in employment is more modest in early decades, compared to 
later decades. Consequently, the need for subsidies is more modest in early decades, and a smaller part 
of the revenue generated by the electricity tax reform is redistributed in the subsidy scheme in early 
decades. These effects have moderated the percentage employment decrease in these industries, which 
only amounts to a little more than half of the percentage fall in production. This contributes to explain 
why only about half of the revenue generated by the electricity tax reform is recycled through the 
subsidy scheme, while the remainder is recycled through cuts in the payroll tax rate. 
3.2.3. Effects of the production subsidy component: 
The effects of the production subsidy component financed by lump sum taxation are found by 
comparing the job-preserving reform scenario, with the subsidy financing scenario. Both the electricity 
tax reform, and the payroll tax rate decrease, is identical in both scenarios. The only difference 
between the scenarios is the production subsidy component in the job-preserving reform scenario, 
while the equivalent amount of revenue is transferred lump sum in the subsidy financing scenario.  
 
In the job-preserving reform scenario, the production dependent subsidies are introduced to neutralize 
the adverse employment effects in the energy-intensive industry. The first round effect of introducing 
                                                     
7 The elements in this tax wedge are a marginal tax on labor income, approximating 40 percent on average, indirect consumer 
taxes, including the VAT averaging 22 percent, and the payroll tax, averaging about 13 percent (in the BAU system), and a 5 
percent markup in the domestic industry.  
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production dependent subsidies in the electricity-intensive industry is a cost reduction, and a 
subsequent up-scaling of production, which result in excess labor demand and accumulation of foreign 
assets. The resulting steady state wager rate increase is found by comparing the job-preserving reform 
scenario with the subsidy financing scenario. It shows that the steady state wage rate increases by 0,72 
percent (0,94-0,22, see table 3.1). There is a marginal decrease in steady state full consumption, 
although present value welfare increases slightly. The wage rate increase contributes to restore the 
external balance by reducing export and raising import shares. The wage increase also reduces the 
excess labor demand through both supply and demand effects.   
 
The welfare effect of the production subsidy component (with lump-sum financing) amounts to only 4-
5 percent of the welfare gain in the reference reform scenario. The increase in supply of labor 
contributes positively because of the large tax wedge between leisure and material consumption. 
However, the substantial expansion of the electricity-intensive industry contributes negatively because 
of favorable taxation, long-term power contracts, low payroll taxes motivated by its peripheral 
location and exemption from the 2CO tax on process-related emissions. 
3.3. Preserving employment for a limited period of time   
This section study effects of a time constrained subsidy scheme, where employment in the electricity-
intensive industry is preserved for a limited period of time. The time constrained job-preserving 
reform scenario consists of the electricity tax reform components, in addition to the two subsidy 
scheme components the first decade, and where these two components are gradually removed the 
following decade. Effects of this time constrained subsidy scheme are analyzed by comparing this 
scenario, with the reference reform scenario. The effects of introducing these components are 
discussed in the previous sections, hence it will not be repeated. However, the time constrained 
durations of these components limits their effects on the economy. Revenue generated in periods after 
the components are removed, is recycled as payroll tax rate decreases.  
 
The welfare cost of this time constrained subsidy scheme amounts to 18.6 percent, calculated as a 
percentage of the welfare gain in the reference reform scenario. This again amounts to about half of 
the welfare cost generated by the subsidy scheme where employment in the electricity-intensive 
industry is preserved in all future periods. The main factor that contributes to explain this difference is 
a lower need for revenue to finance the time constrained subsidy scheme. Consequently, more revenue 
is recycled through a reduction in the payroll tax rate. This generates a welfare gain that contributes to 
explain the difference in welfare costs.  
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The long-term power contracts, which expire within 2010, contribute to lower the social marginal 
product of labor in the electricity intensive industry in the short run. This contributes to increase the 
welfare cost of preserving jobs in these industries in the short run, compared to preserving jobs in the 
long run. On the other hand, the subsidy schemes contribute to increase demand for electricity, and 
hence, increase the Nordic price of electricity in the short run. This generates a terms of trade gain in 
the short run which lowers the welfare cost of the time constrained subsidy scheme relative to the 
infinite subsidy scheme.   
 
Table 3.2. Effects of the time constrained job-saving reform, percentage changes from the BAU 
scenario 
Year 2010 2030 2100 
GDP 0.01 -0.17 -0.36 
Private consumption  -0.01 0.09 0.09 
Labor supply 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 
Full consumption -0.034 0.059 0.079 
Wage rate to workers -0.19 -0.62 -0.70 
Price, material consumption -0.37 -0.73 -0.76 
Export -0.44 -2.23 -4.22 
Import -0.66 -1.52 -1.25 
Payroll tax rate -3.7 -7.0 -5.5 
Labor force, Metal -0.7 -13.3 -21.1 
Production, Metal  -9.7 -21.5 -27.6 
Electricity price, Manu. Metal  38.2 49.9 49.6 
Electricity use, Metal sector. -26.3 -40.8 -46.1 
 
3.4. Potential welfare gain of reallocating jobs  
The welfare cost of introducing a job preserving subsidy scheme may exceed the welfare cost of 
alternative policies designed to relieve local and regional employment concerns. A reallocation of 
labor into other sectors is one alternative. However, the functioning of the local labor market is crucial 
in this respect. Completely flexible markets where workers and other resources are freely allocated 
into other sectors without incurring additional costs would solve local employment concerns 
connected to a uniform electricity tax reform. On the other hand, restrictions in the mobility of labor in 
the energy industry, combined with wage rigidity, is likely to erode most of the potential welfare gain 
associated with a uniform 2CO  tax reform in the Norwegian economy, see Bye (2000). To illuminate 
further on the tradeoff between efficiency and local/ regional employment concerns, this study 
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calculates the potential welfare gain of imposing the uniform electricity tax reform when all markets 
are assumed to be completely flexible. Transaction costs connected to reallocating workers and other 
resources to other sectors are not included, however, the calculated welfare gain per job-year 
reallocated away from the electricity-intensive industries generates some useful insights.   
 
The welfare gain of the reference reform is divided by the number of full time jobs reallocated away 
from the electricity-intensive industry as a result of the reform. Future full time jobs are weighted with 
the discount factor of the economy, to get a welfare measure per full time job reallocated away from 
the electricity-intensive industry to other sectors. The resulting welfare gain per full time job amounts 
to 432.000 NoK, which is about 1.5 times the average wage cost.  
 
The welfare cost of the subsidy scheme introduced in the job-preserving reform scenario is divided by 
the number of (weighted) full time jobs reallocates back to the electricity-intensive industry. This 
amounts to 174.000 NOK per full time job preserved in the electricity-intensive industry. The welfare 
cost per full time job preserved in the electricity-intensive industry by the subsidy scheme in the time 
constrained job-preserving reform scenario amounts to 194.000 NoK, which, compared to the subsidy 
scheme in the job-preserving reform, is a little higher. Two factors contribute to explain this difference 
in welfare cost per full time job preserved by these reforms. First, the long-term power contracts that 
are terminated in 2010 contribute to lowering the social marginal product of labor in the energy-
intensive industry in the short run. This contributes to increase the cost per job year saved in the first 
decade. Second, the subsidy scheme increases demand for electricity, which increases the Nordic price 
of electricity in early decades. The following cost increase tends to lower production, and hence 
demand for labor. This effect increases the level of subsidies needed to preserve one full time job, and 
hence, the subsidy financing cost per job preserved this period. On the other hand, substitution from 
electricity intensive machinery towards more labor-intensive production tends to neutralize this effect. 
A terms of trade gain contributes in the opposite direction.  
4. Conclusions 
Welfare analyses of energy taxes typically show that systems with uniform rates perform better than 
differentiated systems. However, most western countries include some exemptions for their energy-
intensive export industry, and hence, avoid this potential welfare gain. Studies of the tradeoff between 
overall efficiency and political pressure aimed at preserving employment in the energy industry find 
that uniform energy taxation combined with a wage subsidy scheme outperform a differentiated 
energy tax system in terms of efficiency; see Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) for the German case, 
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and Felder and Schleiniger (2002) for the Swiss case. This study contributes to the literature by 
analyzing the tradeoff between efficiency gains from a uniform electricity tax reform and local 
employment concerns, when production dependent subsidies preserve employment in the Norwegian 
electricity-intensive industry, and finds that a uniform electricity tax combined with production 
dependent subsidies preserve jobs at a lower welfare cost compared to the current differentiated 
electricity tax system. However, preserving these jobs is found to be costly, as the potential welfare 
gain per job reallocated away from the electricity intensive industry due to the electricity tax reform 
amounts to about 60 percent of the wage cost per job. In contrast, Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) 
report a welfare gain per job preserved by their wage subsidy scheme. However, they do not include 
costs connected to raising revenue to finance the wage subsidy scheme. Note that the subsidy scheme 
in this study increases both profit and export in the electricity-intensive industry. Hence, shareholders 
and pressure groups concerned with export revenue benefit by supporting the subsidy scheme. 
However, preserving existing tax exemptions is even better for these groups.  
 
EU does not object to an electricity tax system that exempts all sectors. Removal of sector specific 
exemptions this way might enhance efficiency without eroding jobs in the energy-intensive industry. 
However, welfare effects of more lenient energy taxation are beyond the scope of this paper.      
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Production Activities in MSG-6 
MSG-6 Code Production Activities 
11 Agriculture 
12 Forestry 
13 Fishing 
14 Breeding of Fish 
21 Fish Products 
22 Meat and Dairy Products 
16 Grain, Vegetables, Fruit, Oils, etc. 
17 Beverages and Tobacco 
18 Textiles, wearing Appeal and Footwear 
26 Furniture and Fixtures 
27 Chemical and Mineral Products, incl. Mining and Quarrying 
28 Printing and Publishing 
34 Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles 
37 Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 
41 Gasoline 
42A Diesel Fuel 
42B Heating Fuels, Paraffin, etc. 
43 Manufacture of Metals 
46 Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 
47 Hired Work and Repairs 
48 Building of Ships 
49 Manufacture and repair of oil drilling rigs and ships, oil production platforms etc. 
55 Construction, excl. of Oil Well Drilling 
60 Ocean Transport - Foreign 
63 Finance and Insurance 
66 Crude Oil 
67 Natural Gas 
68 Services in Oil and Gas Exploration 
69 Pipeline Transport of Oil and Gas 
71 Production of Electricity 
72 Power Net Renting 
73 Sales and Distribution of Electricity 
75 Car and Other Land Transportation 
76 Air Transport 
77 Railroads and Electrical Commuters 
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Table A.1 (cont.) 
MSG-6 Code Production Activities 
78 Ocean Transport - Domestic 
79 Post and Tele Communication 
81 Wholesale and Retail Trade 
83 Dwelling Services 
85 Other Private Services 
89 Imputed Service Charges from Financial Institutions 
 Government Input Activities 
 Central Government 
92C Defense Exclusive of Military Submarines and Aircraft 
92U Military Submarines and Aircraft 
93S Central Government Education and Research 
94S Central Government Health-Care and Veterinary Services etc. 
95S Other Central Government Services 
 Local Government 
93K Local Government Education and Research 
94K Local Government Health-Care and Veterinary Services etc. 
95K Other Local Government Services 
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Appendix B 
B.1  Consumer behavior 
In year t the representative consumer chooses a path of “full consumption”, F, by maximizing 
intertemporal utility given by 
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subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, see Bye and Holmøy (1997) for further details. σF is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in full consumption. The intertemporal utility maximization 
gives the demand for full consumption 
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where r is the world market interest rate on financial wealth, tD is the tax rate on capital income, λ is 
the marginal utility of wealth and PF is the ideal price index of full consumption. Full consumption is 
a CES-composite of material consumption, C, and leisure, LE. The corresponding ideal price index is 
given by 
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where PC is the price index of material consumption and PLE is the price of leisure (net of tax wage 
rate) measured in efficiency units such as labor, implying that the price of leisure must be adjusted 
with g, the factor augmenting technical change. σC  is the elasticity of substitution between material 
consumption and leisure, and αC is the intensity parameter for material consumption. In each period 
full consumption is distributed between leisure and material consumption, see Bye (2003) for further 
details.  
B.2  Intertemporal equilibrium 
A necessary condition for reaching a steady state solution is 
(B.4) ( ) ( )( ) Fgtr D σρ 11111 ++=−+  
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which is a “razor’s edge” condition since r, tD, ρ and g which determines the long run (steady state) 
growth rate of the economy, are all considered as exogenous. In the analyses, equation (B.4) is 
assumed to hold at all points in time. 
B.3  Data and parameters 
The model is calibrated to the 1999 national accounts. For the production functions the elasticities of 
substitution between machinery and energy, the elasticity of substitution between the energy-
machinery aggregate and labor and the elasticity of substitution between the modified real value added 
and various material inputs (see figure B.1.), are adjusted to parameters of a Generalized Leontief 
(GL) cost function estimated on time-series data from the national accounts, see Alfsen et al (1996). 
The elasticities of substitution between electricity and fuel oil in the energy aggregate are based on 
CES-function estimates on time series data by Mysen (1991). Most of these elasticities of substitution 
are smaller than 1. The elasticities of substitution between non-polluting and polluting transports, and 
the corresponding elasticities between the modified real value aggregate and various material inputs 
are set to 0.5, for all industries. 
 
In the model of producer behavior the elasticities of transformation between deliveries to the domestic 
and foreign market are set equal to 4. The elasticities of scale in different industries are then calibrated 
to 0.83, given the elasticities of transformation. The elasticities of substitution between domestic 
products and imported goods are partly based on estimated parameters (see e.g. Svendsen (1990)), but 
adjusted upwards such that all are around 4. For further details of the calibration of the model of 
producer behavior, see Holmøy and Hægeland (1997). 
 
In the consumer model the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σF, equals 0.3, Steigum (1993). 
Econometric estimates of σF vary considerably between different sources, and 0.3 is in the lower end 
of the range of the estimated parameters. The uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.1 
percent, which is based on estimates of labor supply for married women and men on micro-data by 
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). This is consistent with the calibrated elasticity of substitution 
between material consumption and leisure of 0.6, and the share of leisure in the full consumption 
aggregate of 0.4, see also Bye, Holmøy and Strøm (1999) for details. The calibration of the parameters 
in the complete demand system for material consumption is based on detailed econometric studies 
using both micro and macro data, see Wold (1998). 
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Figure B.1. Production technology  
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Figure B.2. Material Consumption 
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